Utilizing FDI to Stay Ahead: The Case of Singapore by Prime, Penelope B.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
International Business Faculty Publications Institute of International Business
2012
Utilizing FDI to Stay Ahead: The Case of Singapore
Penelope B. Prime
Georgia State University, pprime@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/intlbus_facpub
Part of the International Business Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute of International Business at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Business Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For
more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Prime, Penelope B., "Utilizing FDI to Stay Ahead: The Case of Singapore" (2012). International Business Faculty Publications. 32.
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/intlbus_facpub/32
1 
 
  
Utilizing FDI to Stay Ahead: The Case of Singapore 
Penelope B. Prime, Ph.D.1 
  
 
Abstract:  
A country of five million people in 710 square kilometers, Singapore has built itself into an 
integral part of global markets with living standards that are among the highest in the world.  The 
purpose of this article is to apply a capabilities-based approach to understand how a small, 
resource-scarce country dependent on global markets has done so well.  The core of Singapore’s 
success has been the continuous updating and expanding of domestic social capabilities to meet 
the needs of foreign companies.  Government policies were hyper-sensitive to providing 
conditions for foreign firms to be successful.  Foreign firms investing in Singapore by now have 
helped close the income gap with advanced economies and are on the way to closing the 
innovation gap.  Singapore demonstrates that with deliberate attention to building skills, 
institutions and infrastructure, it is possible for a small country to upgrade skills and to move up 
the production-value chain with primary reliance on FDI.  Cultivation of private Singaporean 
firms has been secondary but may be the next step needed to sustain progress, both to respond to 
increased competition from China and others, and to build a knowledge-based economy.       
 
Key words: capabilities-based approach, Singapore, small country development, upgrading, 
structural change 
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Introduction 
In the midst of uncertain global economic conditions with many countries struggling to avoid a 
middle-income trap, Singapore stands out.  A very poor country in the 1960s with little in its 
favor except location, this land of five million people in 710 square kilometers has built itself 
into an integral part of global markets, resulting in living standards that are among the highest in 
the world.   
 The purpose of this article is to explore the Singapore experience in the context of a 
capabilities-based approach (see Paus, Introduction, this volume) to understand why Singapore 
has done so well, especially as a small, resource-scarce country dependent on volatile global 
markets.  Singapore has benefited from its location in Asia and its timing in terms of promoting 
manufacturing exports just as the electronics industry began to build global production networks, 
but it also had to overcome inherited characteristics such as land and labor shortages resulting in 
comparatively high costs of these resources.  I argue that at the core of Singapore’s success has 
been government attention to building domestic social capabilities that were continuously 
updated and expanded to meet the needs of foreign companies.  Government policies were 
hyper-sensitive to providing the conditions for foreign firms to be successful. In particular, the 
government provided incentives to foreign labor to immigrate to Singapore to fill skill shortages, 
invested in general education and specific skills training, and built world-class infrastructure.  
While the government selectively intervened in domestic markets, such as for labor and land, it 
maintained an open business environment for foreign investment and trade.  Hence, the 
Singapore case demonstrates that it is possible for a small country to upgrade skills and to move 
up the production-value chain in an open market context with primary reliance on foreign direct 
investment (FDI).   
 The People’s Action Party (PAP) has dominated political power since 1959, providing 
stability and leadership. This leadership developed cohesive policies across institutions of 
government and sectors of the economy that did not leave the development process to market 
forces alone.  This helped create a policy environment that blended the needs of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) with benefits for Singaporeans.  Singapore’s success has been a function of 
a proactive government that utilized both horizontal and vertical industrial policies.  The 
horizontal policies focused on supplying and upgrading infrastructure and appropriate labor 
skills; generating resources to pay for the incentives needed to encourage TNCs to come to the 
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country; enabling public-private communication and cooperation; and building and maintaining a 
competitive, business-friendly environment for both foreign and domestic firms.  Companies in 
targeted sectors that received incentives were expected, in turn, to deliver on performance 
measured by exports, training, technological upgrading or research and development.  Hence the 
vertical policies also encouraged spillover benefits.  Government companies have been an 
important piece of this process, especially in providing logistics and other business services, 
while cultivation of home-grown, private Singaporean firms has been secondary. This is the 
weakest link in Singapore’s capabilities-based approach.  Looking to the future, focusing 
incentives and resources toward the development of local capabilities for small and medium-
sized private firms may be needed to sustain progress.       
 
Economic Outcomes 
Singapore’s economic development has been successful by many measures.  Overall GDP, GDP 
per capita, quality of life, exports and export capabilities, and wages have all grown 
substantially.  Growth rates have been healthy, and the manufacturing’s share of GDP has 
remained above 20% (Table 1).  Population growth has been sensitive to immigration policy, as 
is evident in the substantial variations in the population growth rates over time.  GDP per capita 
has climbed steadily and now is one of the highest in the world.   Quality of life, as represented 
by life expectancy, has climbed steadily to over 80 years.  Wage growth has generally followed 
the upward trend in GDP per capita.  Real wages increased only slightly until the late 1970s 
because of a deliberate policy to provide low-cost labor to export industries, but have increased 
steadily since (Akkemik 2005).  Access to low-cost housing, education and training, and jobs has 
given Singaporeans opportunities to advance in an environmentally clean and safe setting 
(Ghesquiere 2007).   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  Changes in export composition reflect an impressive growth in Singapore-based firm 
capabilities (Table 2).   Manufacturing exports as a share of merchandise exports increased from 
just under 30% in 1970 to a high of 85% by 2000.  Since then the share has fallen off to about 
70% by 2010.  Of manufactured exports, more than half were classified as high-tech by the 
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1990s.  Exports of information and communications technology (ICT) were also more than half 
of total exports by the 1990s, although this category fell to 35% by 2009.  Exports of ICT 
services were also present by the 2000s, representing 2.8% of service exports by 2010.   
  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 U.N. data also show the changing composition of Singapore’s trade over time (Table 3).  
In 1989-90, 36% of total exports and 27% of total imports were high-tech products.  The 1999-
2000 figures show an increase to 60% for exports and 48% for imports, although both fell by 
2007-08 to 48% and 38% respectively.   Whereas Singapore started out emphasizing low-tech, 
labor-intensive exports, by the 1990s high-tech trade was dominant.  This is one indicator of 
successful upgrading in Singapore.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
  
 One performance indicator that has been questionable for Singapore over the decades is 
factor productivity.   While labor productivity generally has increased until most recently, 
Akkemik (2005) estimates that labor shifts across sectors since the mid-1980s have had a 
negative impact.  Attention to questionable progress in factor productivity in Singapore and other 
Asian economies was stimulated by Young’s (1992) well-known study showing Singapore 
experienced low productivity growth in the first couple of decades because of very high input 
use.  Other studies followed to re-test this result.  Many found somewhat higher estimates but 
few show stellar performance, although productivity—especially capital productivity—seems to 
have improved in the 1990s (Wong 2003: 231-232; Chia 2005: 4-5; Ghesquiere 2007).  In 
general, it is not surprising to have higher input use in earlier stages of development with higher 
productivity later (Chang 2005: 113-114), and the ability to mobilize resources for growth is 
commendable in itself.  However, multifactor productivity in Singapore has fallen based on 
productivity estimates by the Singaporean government over the last part of the 2000s (Figure 1).  
Declines in labor productivity appear to be especially serious, falling from 7% growth in 2004 to 
0.9% decline in 2007 (WTO 2008: Table AI.1).  A key question is whether this trend is a short-
term dip influenced by global financial problems or a reflection of deeper issues possibly related 
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to the fall in manufacturing’s share of GDP and the fall in high-tech exports, as shown in Tables 
1-3.    
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
 To summarize, Singapore’s economy has done very well since its start in the 1960s.  
Firms within the country have shown an ability to increase value added in production, as well as 
to improve the technology base of products.  These companies have moved up the value chain, 
and the people of Singapore have achieved developed-economy-level living standards.  Other 
economies in the region, such as Malaysia and Thailand, have struggled much more (Yusuf and 
Nabeshima 2009; Doner 2009).  How was Singapore able to accomplish this, and is the current 
development path sustainable given declines in productivity, manufacturing as a percentage of 
GDP and high-tech exports observed in recent years?   
 
Using Institutions and Policy to Build Social Capabilities 
Singapore’s economy has been open to trade and investment since a brief period of import 
substitution between 1963 and 1965 (Blomqvist 2000: 9).  Singapore has become known as a 
place where government is efficient and uncorrupted, and competition is welcomed (Brown and 
Tucker 2010).  This global reputation is reflected in high scores that Singapore earns on many of 
the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rankings.  Singapore earned the highest overall 
ranking globally in 2011 and 2012 out of 183 countries (World Bank Group 2012).  Singapore 
was also number 1 in the “trading across borders” category (ease in hiring, setting work hours 
and redundancy costs), and number 2 in the “protecting investors” and “resolving insolvency” 
categories.  Singapore does not restrict profit or capital flows and does not impose trade tariffs 
except for a few products such as alcohol, tobacco, petroleum and motor vehicles (WTO 2009: 
60).  The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the country’s central bank, sets the exchange 
rate within an undisclosed band with the ultimate goal of domestic price stability. Inflation 
averaged only 3% between 1964 and 2004, and the MAS intervened to prevent the currency from 
becoming overvalued (Ghesquiere 2007: Chapter 3).  Consequently, approximately 7,000 foreign 
firms have Singapore-based operations (Lim and Wei 2010: 3).   
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 Within the context of internationally open markets and an excellent business 
environment, domestic policy has targeted incentives to encourage foreign companies to invest 
in Singapore.  The main government body setting economic policy has been the Economic 
Development Board (EDB), which was established by statute in 1961.  The EDB’s first task was 
to attract foreign investment (EDB website).  It opened its first overseas offices in New York and 
Hong Kong.  Its mission, as articulated on its website, continues to encourage FDI in Singapore 
using tax and non-tax incentives while planning for the country’s future. 
 In addition to the EDB, the government has utilized land ownership, other statutory 
boards and government linked companies (GLCs) as the core instruments of industrial policy 
(WTO 2008: 53-60).  More than 80% of the land in Singapore is owned by the government.  
Land is leased at fair-market rates for 99 years for residences and commercial property, 30 or 60 
years for industrial development and 20 years for agriculture.  These lease sales generate 
revenues as well as allow influence over the pricing and allocation of land.    
 The statutory boards, of which the EDB is the most visible, were created to help 
implement industrial policies and have focused on providing infrastructure and public utility 
services.  Recently, however, their focus has shifted to development of knowledge and value-
added activities.  These boards are set up by parliament and fall under the jurisdiction of relevant 
ministries.   
 Unique to Singapore, GLCs are a type of state-owned enterprise that has played a major 
role in domestic development, especially in the early years.  GLCs are generally defined by 
shares held by Temasek Holdings, the government’s investment institution, or directly by 
statutory boards (Ramirez and Tan 2003).  In many cases, former statutory boards or other public 
agencies evolved into GLCs.  Examples are Singapore Airlines and Singapore 
Telecommunications.  Some of the first GLCs were involved in shipbuilding, oil rig construction 
and defense-related manufacturing and services for the military (Low 2001: 115).  Smaller GLCs 
include public hospitals and educational institutions such as the National University of Singapore 
and Nanyang Technical University (WTO 2008: 56). 
 Initially set up to compensate for a lack of private funding and expertise, GLCs now 
number in the hundreds and represent 20% of Singapore exchange marketization (Ramirez and 
Tan 2003).   GLCs are run competitively and have been partially privatized over time through 
share issuance on the Singapore Stock Exchange (Geok 2004).  They represent the majority of 
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Singapore’s own TNCs and have substantial overseas investment.  At this stage, GLCs do not 
receive special funding, tax benefits or other preferences, and one empirical study found no 
evidence of easier access to credit (Ramirez and Tan 2003).  Information is scarce, however, 
because the state considers GLC activities confidential (Ramirez and Tan 2003: 6; Low 2001: 
120).   
 Singapore also has private national firms, some of them large but most small or medium-
sized (SMEs).  Foreign firms have been its most important corporate sector by far.  Since the 
1970s, foreign firms have produced 70% to 75% of Singapore’s manufacturing output 
(Blomqvist 2000: 11).  At the end of the 1980s, locally owned firms contributed only 15% of the 
value added in manufacturing, 15% of gross output, 28% of employment and 6.5% of exports 
(van Elkan 1995: 6, table 3-1).  The rest was generated by wholly- or majority-owned foreign 
firms.  Even a decade and a half later, 90% of the business establishments in Singapore were 
local SMEs, but they employed only half of the labor force and produced only one-third of the 
output measured as value added.  Most of these firms were not entrepreneurial and mostly 
engaged in activities in the domestic market such as construction and personal and social 
services (Chia 2005: 11).   As one indication of how Singapore views this mix of firms, national 
statistics rarely separate economic activity by national and foreign ownership, or by state and 
private.2   
 
Policy Space: Sources of Development Funding 
Singapore has relied on foreign direct investment more than most countries.  Net inflows of FDI 
averaged 6% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1970s, 10% in the 1980s, and 12% and 
15% in the 1990s and 2000s (World Bank, World Development Indicators).  Between 1980 and 
1985, FDI was almost 19% of domestic investment and almost 28% between 1994 and 1997 
(Lall 2003: 43, Table 2.9).  This compares with 7% and 10% in Hong Kong and 0.4% and 1.1% 
in South Korea, in the same two time periods.  Singapore’s success in attracting FDI can be 
attributed in part to affordable housing, recreation, clean environment, low crime, efficient 
services, quality infrastructure, sufficient power and clean water, and attentive, non-corrupt 
government.  In these aspects, Singapore was competitive with Hong Kong (Yusuf et al. 2008: 
12-13).   
                                                 
2 When data is published on “local” firms the definition is establishments with at least 50% local equity.   
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 Foreign investors also have enjoyed numerous incentives, including tax breaks, few 
restrictions and pre- and post-investment services from government agencies.  In 1959, the 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance and the Industrial Expansion Ordinance were passed, both of which 
offered tax breaks to encourage the establishment and development of manufacturing.  Tax 
breaks for exports were added as part of the Economic Expansion Act of 1967.  Incentives 
beyond tax reductions included, for example, local enterprise finance, local enterprise technical 
assistance, start-up enterprise development, technopreneur programs, the skills development fund 
and initiatives in new technology (WTO 2008: Box III.1 and table AIII.8).  A unique 
characteristic of these incentives is that all are directed at rewarding expansion, upgrading, 
establishing regional or global headquarters, earning royalties, encouraging innovation or 
introducing high-tech skills as opposed to encouraging any specific industry (Chia 2005: 19-21; 
Respondek 2008 as referenced in Lim and Wei 2010: 5-6).   
 These incentives were available to both foreign and local firms, but data indicate foreign 
firms took advantage of them much more than local firms did (Blomqvist 2000: 11).  One study 
reported that the post-tax return of foreign firms was on average twice that of local firms, and 
three times as high in manufacturing.  The difference between firms’ returns in pioneering 
industries as compared with others was also high.  These data imply that tax incentives made a 
difference, and foreign firms benefited substantially from them (van Elkan 1995: 15 and table 
3.2).  
 In addition to the foreign capital that flowed into Singapore, domestic funding also was 
plentiful.  Savings rates have been very high, reaching or exceeding 40% for the past 30 years.    
Consistent with rising savings, household consumption as a share of GDP fell over the decades.  
By 2010, household consumption was low at 37% of GDP (World Bank, World Development 
Indicators).  Central to creating the high saving rates was the Central Provident Fund (CPF).  
This was set up as a compulsory private savings mechanism for retirement, originally established 
by the British in 1955.  Households also saved more than the CPF regime required.  Some 
studies have suggested that demographics, the lack of government-provided welfare and steadily 
rising incomes explain many of Singapore’s saving trends (Ghesquiere 2007).  In addition, 
budget surpluses and profits of GLCs pushed government revenue to an average of about 27% of 
GDP, compared with 22% in the 1970s (World Bank, World Development Indicators).   The 
Singapore government has not borrowed to finance deficits in many years (CIA Factbook).   
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Social Capabilities to Attract and Keep FDI 
To attract FDI, Singapore focused on creating an environment supportive of foreign companies 
and their employees.  Three cornerstones of this environment were infrastructure, education and 
pro-development institutions. 
 
Infrastructure 
From the beginning of Singapore’s development, the importance of infrastructure to capturing 
the country’s location advantage was recognized and acted upon (Table 4).  The port, of course, 
was central to the country’s role in regional trade.  The government also purposefully planned 
modern living environments with good housing and transport to help attract foreign companies 
and employees.  As technology changed, new infrastructure investment was initiated to connect 
Singapore to global information systems.  Further, the Singaporean government has viewed 
infrastructure in broad terms.  Aside from providing excellent basic infrastructure such as 
airports, roads and public utilities, the city included affordable housing and facilities to assist 
industrial sectors’ research and manufacturing development (Vietor and Thompson 2006: 3).   
 
Education  
At the time of independence, only 50% of Singapore’s population was literate in any language 
(Blomqvist 2000: 5).  By 1980, literacy had risen to 80% and by 2008 it was 95% (World Bank, 
World Development Indicators).  By the late 1990s, Singapore ranked second in the educational 
performance index (Oxfam International 1999 as referenced in OECD 2000: 54), and in the 2009 
PISA educational comparison, Singapore ranked fifth in reading, and fourth in math and science 
(OECD 2010).  According to the 2000 Census, 35% of the population speaks Mandarin as their 
primary language and 23% speak English (CIA Factbook).  Twenty-three percent of the labor 
force had a tertiary education in 2007 (World Bank, World Development Indicators).   
 Government expenditures on education have not been particularly high, however:  just 
3% of GDP in 2001, which was lower than 122 other countries (CIA Factbook).  Even by 2010, 
education spending remained low at 3.3% of GDP.  As a share of government revenue, education 
spending was about 10% in 2010, the same as in 1983 and below that of the OECD countries 
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(about 13%) and far below developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (15%) 
(World Bank, World Development Indicators).   
 Singapore’s educational system has developed an effective industrial and vocational 
training system that has been able to continuously upgrade its curriculum (Wong 2003: 222).  It 
was designed in cooperation with EDB and foreign entities such as the French 
Electrical/Electronic Industry Federation and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation.   
 A second distinctive feature of the Singaporean approach to supplying skilled labor has 
been to encourage immigration of foreign workers when shortages of particular skills existed.  
By 1999, for example, more than 17% of the R&D-focused scientists and engineers were 
foreign, many from India and China (Wong 2003: 223).  This number did not include the many 
who had already received permanent residency.  According to the 2010 census, Singapore’s total 
population was 5.1 million, of which 3.8 million were citizens or permanent residents (Singapore 
Department of Statistics).  This flexible immigration policy has allowed for rising capabilities 
before the education system could adequately deliver the quantity and quality of talent needed.    
 Both of these features underscore the linking of education policy to industrial policy.  
Despite obvious successes, policy makers worry that teaching methods are too passive to 
stimulate critical thinking and creativity that will be required for the next stage of upgrading.  
Reforms initiated in the late 1990s were directed at these concerns (OECD 2000: 55).  In 
addition to curriculum changes and adding a variety of activities to the school day, Singapore 
also began initiatives with universities abroad, such as MIT, to access lectures electronically and 
to encourage the establishment of campuses in Singapore. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Pro-development Institutions 
Organizations that are capable of coordinating and implementing policy, as well as enabling 
communication between business and government, are themselves part of a society’s capabilities 
(Abramovitz 1986).  The Singaporean government over the years has focused on economic 
strategy in the context of how to position the country within the global context (Sheth 2009).  
The government has been proactive, as well as responsive to problems when needed, but with 
clear strategic targets—similar to a business, as one author suggested (Blomqvist 2000: 4).  
Single-party continuity has been helpful with the PAP being in power since 1959.  Two people in 
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particular played major roles in placing and keeping Singapore on the development track:  Lee 
Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee (Goh Chok Tong), who were Prime Ministers between 1965 and 
1990 and 1990 and 2004, respectively.  The executive leadership maintained tight control over 
economic policy-making and sought technical advice upon which decisions were based.  The 
elections of 2011, when PAP won a slim majority, were the first time the electorate signaled that 
traditional power arrangements might not be inevitable forever.   
 Fundamental to the pro-FDI approach, Singapore needed to understand which services 
and infrastructure would attract and assist foreign firms, and then to communicate the incentives 
and environment they were offering.  Singaporean institutions also needed to communicate and 
coordinate among themselves.  As there were many of these organizations, this was no small 
feat.  Descriptions of the Singapore developmental state are clear that coordination and 
communication was done very successfully (e.g., Blomqvist 2000, Chia 2005, Ho 2003).  Doner 
(2009) argues that this type of institutional capacity is fundamentally political, and that 
Singapore is one example of successful public-private consultation.  The EDB itself plays a 
central role by promoting Singapore to foreign firms and ascertaining what foreign firms need in 
order to move to, and to stay in, Singapore.  The ability to be flexible with policy and change as 
needed is also critical, and evidence shows that Singapore has been fairly good at this (Ho 2003).   
 Within Singapore competing interests also needed to be recognized and accommodated.  
For example, one possible unmeasured benefit of continuing to have GLCs could be that the 
government connections make policy formation and implementation easier than if the EDB and 
other government institutions had to deal only with private firms.  As long as GLCs are as 
efficient and innovative as they would be if they were private, then this benefit would matter 
greatly over time.  This connection is implied by Ho’s (2003) discussion of “embeddedness,” 
which points to a lack of interest group pressure combined with enough connection to industry to 
convey and receive good information about what is happening and what should be improved for 
future development.  Blomqvist’s (2000) discussion of the “endogenous” role of the state in the 
Singapore case is similar.  Ghesquiere (2007) emphasizes the merit-based nature of elites in 
Singapore and the sharing of benefits via opportunities to be upwardly mobile.    
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Development Phases Shaped by Internal-External Dynamics 
The adaptation of government policy and institution-building to changing conditions can be seen 
throughout the country’s development phases.  Names of policies and initiatives used by officials 
and analysts over time reflect a focus on capabilities and upgrading, with a core focus on 
attracting and keeping foreign firms.   
 
Creating Jobs: 1965-1978 
The first main phase of development focused on building infrastructure and a manufacturing 
base to create jobs for Singaporeans.  Unemployment was about 9% and the exit of the British 
military was expected to cause even more job loss (Blomqvist 2000: 20).  Relations with 
neighbors, Malaysia in particular, were tense, so policies were created that looked beyond the 
region (Ho 2003: 431).  A Dutch economist and long-time advisor to Singapore, Albert 
Winsemius, is credited with suggesting that Singapore build good relations with the West to 
encourage foreign investment and access to those markets, and to emphasize high-tech in the 
country’s industrial development (Ong 2009).    
 Singapore was successful in attracting multinational companies early on, and especially 
benefited from the investment of two U.S. firms:  National Semiconductor and Texas 
Instruments (Athukorala 2008).  By the 1980s, almost every electronics producer had some 
presence in Singapore, making the country the major exporter of disk drives by the end of that 
decade.  Foreign companies were attracted by low wages, which were mandated by policy at the 
time, but apparently they also especially liked Singapore’s location and friendly business 
environment, including tax incentives.  Public goods provision such as physical and institutional 
infrastructure and support to R&D were also attractive, along with subsidized financing for 
exports (Blomqvist 2000: 13).   
 The FDI that came to Singapore during these years was part of emerging global 
networks, or production fragmentation, at the time.  Increasingly intermediate products, such as 
disk drives, were being outsourced to countries with matching comparative advantage based on 
factor endowments (Hoon and Ho 2001).  Singapore was not a large enough market to be the 
main end-user of computers, so being part of the global supply chain was a good way to leverage 
what turned out to be a substantial growth segment in global trade over the past 50 years.     
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 Because of early success of attracting industry, the end of this period was characterized 
by labor shortages (Beng 1997: 97; Akkemik 2005).  Since wages were barely allowed to 
increase to encourage export-oriented, labor-intensive industries, the result was prolonged 
disequilibrium in the labor market.   
 
Upgrading Local Skills: 1979-1990 
The next phase began with sharply rising wages spearheaded by the National Wage Council.  
The Council, established in 1972, recommended annual wage increases (Akkemik 2005).  There 
was a push to increase labor productivity by moving into capital intensive production and 
acquiring skills needed to support a changing industrial structure.  Wages rose substantially.  In 
response to recession in 1985, however, the Council adopted a flexible wage system that allowed 
for both bonuses and downward adjustment in bad economic times.   
 Policy initiatives continued to try to attract industrial TNCs to Singapore.  Wages, in fact, 
turned out not to be a major obstacle, probably because skills were rising in tandem.  The Skills 
Development Fund (SDF) was established in 1979 to finance retraining of workers and to 
promote labor-saving investments.  Throughout the 1980s, a series of programs was initiated to 
supplement these efforts, including the Basic Education for Skills Training program, a Modular 
Skills Training program, a Secondary Education program and the Core Skills for Effectiveness 
and Change program (Beng 1997: 96-100).  Rising skills were needed to meet the needs of 
targeted industries including computers, computer peripherals, electronic medical instruments, 
automotive components, specialty chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and optical and photocopying 
equipment (Encyclopedia of the Nations).    
 The effort to move beyond labor-intensive industry included incentives for Singapore 
companies to move unsophisticated production off-shore.  Initially targeted at local firms, it was 
mostly GLCs and foreign firms that set up production in nearby countries but also in India and 
China as well.  Coined the “second wing” or “external wing” policy, this strategy was designed 
to overcome resource and market constraints at home by building links in the region (Blomqvist 
2000: 25-26).  Part of the process was for GLCs to set up industrial parks in China, India, 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia that provided infrastructure, including schools for employees’ 
children, and other incentives for Singapore-based firms to locate production there while 
upgrading their own activities in Singapore (Pereira 2005).  Outward foreign investment from 
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Singapore increased from S$2.2 billion in 1976 to S$14.2 billion in 1989 (van Elkan 1995: 14).  
The establishment of the Johor-Batam-Singapore triangle with Malaysia and Indonesia in 1989 
was a complementary move.  Singapore supplied capital to the factories in industrial parks in 
Johor and Batam, while these areas supplied food, water and raw materials back to Singapore, 
and utilized Singapore’s trading services (Lim 2001: 198-199).  Tourism was also important, 
especially Singaporeans and others visiting the islands around Batam.  Outward investment 
reached S$37 billion (US$ 52 billion) by 1995, of which more than 30% was to Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand (Ho 2003: 432).  
 
Exploiting Production Networks using Local Capabilities: 1991-1998 
Singapore’s early entry into regional networks helped place the country in a strong position to 
take advantage of changing production patterns once China entered the global market.  After an 
initial decade of reforms and opening, China became a center of manufacturing assembly.  
Singapore’s exports to developed markets such as the U.S. began to slow, with some evidence 
that rising competition from China was a factor (Liu 2007).  In response, Singapore, and ASEAN 
more generally, increasingly took advantage of a growing Chinese demand, exporting 
components and parts to China.  Between 1992 and 2005, ASEAN’s share of parts and 
components exports to China increased from 0.5% to 36% (Athukorala 2008: 505).  In 2004 
alone, Singapore’s exports to China increased more than 50%, much of which comprised 
electronic components, and likewise China became an increasingly important supplier of inputs 
and goods to Singapore (Liu 2007: 511-512). 
 China’s entry into global manufacturing also meant that Singapore needed to continue to 
upgrade its skills and increase the sophistication of its industrial base to keep ahead of China’s 
capabilities.  By the late 1980s, Singapore had substantial strength in chemicals, electronics and 
precision engineering, logistics and transport services, information and communication, and 
media.  However, strategic planners had a vision of a knowledge-based economy and set out to 
develop innovative capabilities as a way to stay ahead of competition (Vietor and Thompson 
2006: 12).  Singapore was weak compared to some of its Asian competitors in high-tech sectors, 
and Singaporean local firms were moving in the opposite direction -- into basic services such as 
tourism -- as labor-intensive manufacturing was being moved to other countries with lower costs.  
15 
 
These trends caused policy makers to emphasize manufacturing and services as twin engines of 
growth (Blomqvist 2000: 14-17). 
 A study called “The Next Lap” issued in 1991 called for technological upgrading 
(Blomqvist 2000: 15).  The National Science and Technology Board was established, and 
national science and technology plans were instituted.  Singapore’s national innovation system 
had relied on the presence of TNCs up to this point (Wong 2003).  Fortunately for Singapore, the 
TNCs engaged in increasingly sophisticated innovation over time, which to some extent spilled 
over to the local economy.  In this phase, however, the Technology Investment Fund was created 
specifically to help local Singapore entrepreneurs and companies innovate throughout the 
economy.  This approach was designed not simply to supplement the activities of the TNCs, as 
had been the case of new initiatives in the past, but rather to strengthen Singapore as a “…vibrant 
enterprise system—a total environment bringing together companies big and small, foreign and 
local, thriving in synergy and symbiosis” (Teo Ming Kian, Chairman, EDB, quoted in Vietor and 
Thompson 2006: 12).  A series of national science and technological plans (NSTP) followed, 
along with increasing investments in R&D and technological infrastructure.  The NSTPs targeted 
13 clusters and 6 “thrusts.”  A number of institutions were established to help link local SMEs to 
evolving technology, including the Technology Development Centre, the National Productivity 
Board and the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research (Wong 2003, 
Farhoomand 2005 7-8).   
 The success of these policy initiatives has varied.  Wong (2003: 224) shows that 
technology spillover has been quite strong between local and international entities, but linkages 
between universities and other public R&D centers and local firms, and among local firms 
themselves, have been much weaker.  He argues it is these links that Singapore needs in order to 
build its own domestic innovative capability.   
 
Increasing Global Competitiveness: 1999-2011   
The Asia Crisis in 1997, followed by the bursting of the dot-com bubble, led to a serious 
economic downturn in Singapore, but perhaps more importantly, it spurred renewed thinking 
about how to lessen the economy’s dependence on manufactured exports and growth in 
Southeast Asian economies.  At that time, almost half of Singapore’s trade was with six 
countries: Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan (Ho 2003: 425).  
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In terms of short-term strategies, the Singapore government responded to the Asia crisis with 
cost-cutting measures that represented 7% of GDP to try to stay competitive as an international 
business location.  The government also largely resisted pressure from developers to halt the fall 
in property values (Ho 2003: 427-429; OECD 2000: 15).  The corporate tax rate was also cut a 
number of times, from 40% in 1986 to 26% in 1997, and then to a low of 18% as of 2008 (Liu 
2007: table 13, p.519; WTO 2008).  
 Goals developed in “The Next Lap” were refined with the EDB’s “Industry 21” 
campaign launched in 1999 to create a “learning nation” across the board (OECD 2000, pp,15-
16; Parayil 2005: 54-55).  An Economic Review Committee was established in 2001 to advise 
the government on ways to “remake Singapore.”  In 2003 it offered recommendations to make 
Singapore a creative and entrepreneurial nation with a globalized and diversified economy 
(Singapore, Ministry of Trade and Industry).  
 A key aspect of implementing the first recommendation has been to negotiate a series of 
trade agreements.  The only major trade agreement that Singapore had before 2000 was its 
membership in ASEAN.  Since then, agreements have been signed with dozens of countries, 
many of which are beyond Southeast Asia, including the U.S., Japan, India, China, Australia, 
New Zealand, Jordan, Korea, Chile, Panama, Peru, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein.  These agreements are consistent with attempts to lower Singapore’s dependence 
on Southeast Asia and to re-build itself into a global rather than a regional trade hub.  Fouquin 
(2008: 291-292) notes that other Asian countries began to negotiate trade agreements at about the 
same time.  In addition to the Asia crisis, he argues that this was also in response to the U.S 
decision to set up NAFTA.  Until NAFTA, Asia countries had not seen a strong reason to pursue 
agreements beyond the multilateral ones they already had, but NAFTA was seen as a possible 
new “American fortress.”  Spurred in part by these new global agreements, Singapore’s exports 
rose from 192% to 243% of GDP between 2001 and 2008 (World Bank Database).   
 The second two parts of “Industry 21” re-emphasized innovation and creating new local 
companies as part of a knowledge-based economy.  A specific goal has been to build a 
biomedical cluster based on local start-ups and existing local SMEs rather than GLCs that 
previously supported development of the electronics industry (Parayil 2005: 62).  A 
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complementary “SME 21 Report” focused on ways to strengthen local firm capabilities.3  Not 
willing to rely entirely on local capabilities, however, attracting biotech TNCs to the cluster 
continued to be part of the program.  In addition, a special visa program for foreign entrepreneurs 
was begun in 2004 (guidemesingapore.com).  Many foreign biomedical firms have a presence in 
Singapore, and individual scientists also have been enticed to move from their home countries to 
set up laboratories.  A biomedical industrial park, called Biopolis, which includes residential and 
recreational spaces was built near the National University of Singapore.   
 Another piece of the strategy was laid out in “IT2000: A Vision of an Intelligent Island,” 
which focuses on how to use better use IT to enhance the quality of life and business 
environment of Singapore.  Its recommendations focus on improving connectivity, using IT to 
create new learning opportunities and adding electronic applications across the economy (OECD 
2000: 16). 
 Parayil (2005) argues that Singapore shows signs of success in creating a new type of 
business environment with more flexible structures between business and government, 
meaningful interaction with universities to support innovation and start-ups, and the beginnings 
of viable industrial clusters.  He sees these new arrangements as qualitatively better at creating 
an innovative economic environment than approaches of decades past, which, while successful at 
producing goods, did not lend themselves to developing dynamic Singaporean companies or to 
supporting new ideas and innovations.  Value added in the biotech industrial cluster has 
increased, and start-ups have been launched.   
 
Evidence of Firm Capabilities 
Singapore has relied on the presence of TNCs to establish and upgrade industries over the 
decades.  Even with the new thrust toward building a knowledge economy and encouraging local 
firm development, this strategy has not changed.  Some countries have trouble gaining benefits 
from the presence of FDI.  This does not seem to be the case with Singapore.  The linkages and 
spillovers have been substantial, and far from “footloose,” many foreign firms end up staying 
and upgrading in Singapore.   
                                                 
3 According to Chia (2005: 11 and note 10), an earlier report was issued in 1988, the SME Master Plan, which 
represented the first attempt to focus development policies on local firm capabilities beyond support to TNCs.  She 
suggests, however, that not much progress was made as a result of that plan.   
18 
 
 While incentives for firms were not initially aimed at foreign firms specifically, for 
various reasons they were the ones who benefited (Blomqvist 2000: 11).  In any case, local 
entrepreneurs and local manufacturing were nurtured by the state much later.  In the meantime, 
by supporting TNCs, local industries and the capabilities of the local labor force advanced.  One 
measure of the advancement of firms in a country is the type of businesses that exist and how 
these have changed over time.  In Singapore’s case, a move from labor-intensive manufacturing 
and basic transport logistics in the 1960s to increasingly sophisticated industrial production and 
service provision is evident from Tables 1-3.  Additional data presented by Athukorala (2008: 
485-86, Table 1) show that Singapore’s export of primary products fell from 26.7 % of non-oil 
exports in the mid-1970s to 6.1% by 2003/04, while manufactured exports rose from 73.3% to 
93.9%.  Within manufactures, machinery and transport rose to 66.5% and electric machinery to 
27.5%.  All of these measures indicate Singapore’s success at competing globally and at 
upgrading production and exports across and within sectors.   
 Measuring the capabilities of firms that support increasing-value-added and the 
sophistication of industries, however, is more difficult and often indirect.  Even more difficult is 
measuring the relative contributions of different types of firms.  In Singapore’s case in the 
context of this study, it would be helpful to know what local firms have contributed to the 
upgrading process as compared with TNCs, and then within local firms, the relative contribution 
of GLCs as compared with private local firms.  There are scattered examples, such as the 
development of indigenous precision engineering that supplied foreign electronics firms (Doner 
2009: 53, 57).  Data by firm ownership are scarce, and even data separated by foreign and local 
firms are difficult to find.  With this caveat, the following may give clues to the Singaporean 
economy’s changing firm capabilities that have propelled the country’s impressive growth in 
GDP per capita and upgrading of export composition.  
 
Entry and Exit  
One might expect that an economy that encourages the creation of companies would experience 
much turnover, in terms of entry but failure as well.  Part of the Industry 21 strategy was to 
encourage start-ups and fresh businesses.  Figure 2 provides data on new and closing firms.  In 
2000, just over 11,500 companies opened with about 4,700 closing.  By 2010, almost 30,000 
firms opened with just over 15,000 closing.  Not surprisingly, with the global economic turmoil 
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in 2009, bankruptcies rose.  Figure 2, however, suggests that Singapore has become a more 
dynamic business environment that may in fact reflect the goals of creating an innovative 
society.  Or, at least, it suggests that incentives to start new companies may have been effective.   
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Research and Development   
A major piece of the “Industry 21” campaign was to increase R&D across the economy. In 1996, 
R&D was 1.4% of GDP, but this increased to 2.6% by 2007 (Table 5).  According the 2010 
National R&D Survey, R&D spending as a percentage of GDP was 2.3% in 2009 and 2.1% in 
2010 (Singapore Agency for Science, Technology & Research 2011).  Growth was seen in R&D 
spending by the government sector, but private sector increases were substantial, from $1.6 
billion in 1999 to more than $5 billion in 2008, although private sector R&D spending fell in 
2009 due to the financial crisis (Figure 3).   More of this investment—both government and 
private--was directed at manufacturing than at services.  The number of researchers and the 
number of published scientific and technical journal articles both increased substantially as well 
(Singapore Department of Statistics).   
 
[Figure 3 about here]  
 
 
 Patent applications—one measure of the outcome of R&D—have risen over time.  
Singapore firms applied for 750 patents in 2009, compared with only 145 in 1995.  Still, foreign 
firms account for many more.  A similar situation existed with trademark applications, but both 
began to grow substantially for residents and non-residents alike in the mid-1980s, suggesting a 
growing dynamism in the economy.   
 This dual dynamism is also suggested by Wong (2003).  While he cites an estimate that 
56% of Singapore’s R&D comes from TNCs, he identifies three sets of local firms that engage in 
R&D.  The first is SMEs that support the TNCs; second, state-controlled GLCs; and third, 
private high-tech startups.   Wong sees evidence that the third group is a recent phenomenon but 
a growing part of Singapore’s landscape.  According to data put together by Farhoomand 
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(2005:11, table 3), in the 1990s, 46% of innovators in Singapore were TNCs, while 45% were 
local firms and organizations and the rest were individuals.  This shows some indigenous 
capability and motivation to innovate.  In stark contrast, however, less than one percent of the 
innovators in South Korea were TNCs.  This is reflected in South Korea’s receiving more than 
11,000 U.S. patents between 1995 and 1999 as compared with 499 for Singapore (Farhoomand 
2005: 2, table 1).   
 
Conclusion 
Singapore’s success can be summarized as the ability to establish and continually advance social 
capabilities while utilizing FDI to lead the economy’s technological and production upgrading.  
Tapping the benefits of FDI is a challenge for many countries, but since so much of Singapore’s 
economy is driven by FDI, this aspect has been critical to Singapore’s success to date.    
 
Reasons for Success 
So how has Singapore been able to benefit so handsomely from the presence of foreign 
companies?  Three factors stand out as explanations for the success: regional context and timing, 
plentiful funding and conservative financing, and a developmentalist state whose policies 
focused on advancing social and firm-level capabilities. These factors are consistent with the 
propositions of the capabilities-based approach as laid out in the Introduction to this volume by 
Paus.  The case of Singapore demonstrates that income convergence is sustainable if it is based 
on capability convergence.   
 
Regional context and timing  
Singapore has benefitted from its location in Asia and its timing in terms of promoting 
manufacturing exports just as the electronics industry began to build global production networks.  
Historical events may have also favored the city-state for foreign investment.  In the mid-1960s, 
just as Singapore was opening for business, East Asia was affected by the turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution in China.  This negatively affected Hong Kong and Taiwan, and perhaps also made 
South Korea less attractive, especially in the aftermath of the Korean War (Athukorala 2008, 
Stubbs 2005).  U.S. and Japanese companies found Singapore to be a good location for 
investment in Asia.  Later, in the mid-1980s, Great Britain’s agreement to negotiate the return of 
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Hong Kong to China created much uncertainty over the colony’s status and how this would 
affect business as well as private households.  While Hong Kong was comparable to Singapore 
in terms of infrastructure and other aspects of doing business, this may have made a difference to 
location decisions for some firms.    
 Singapore’s location continues to provide a benefit.  One reason TNCs have opted to stay 
and upgrade their activities in Singapore even as they move their lower value-added activities is 
that their new production locations are nearby, making them convenient to manage.  For 
example, Malaysia and Indonesia were major recipients of manufacturing as foreign firms 
moved their operations from Singapore to lower-cost locations.  By the 2000s Singapore began 
to market itself as the center of business with both China and India, as these economies were 
growing quickly and Singapore is fairly convenient to both.  The proximity of firms’ activity 
outside Singapore makes it easier for Singapore to focus on the service links that help coordinate 
companies’ cross-border operations (Hoon and Ho 2001:  chapter 20).  This proximity dovetails 
nicely with the country’s comparative strength in logistics.   
 
Plentiful funding and conservative financing 
Building an environment to attract and keep firms is an expensive and long-term investment.  
Government finance in Singapore has been prudent and plentiful.  The mandatory retirement 
system, high household savings, selected land sales and tax revenue have all contributed to the 
resources available for development.  Having the resources to fund the government’s strategy has 
helped immensely to fulfill it.  Foreign funding helped as well, of course, especially for the firm-
specific aspects of development.  Singapore’s financial solvency has been a big plus in an 
uncertain global financial environment, lowering the country’s risk factors substantially.  
 
Developmental state policies focusing on capabilities 
Developmental state policies in Singapore have been consistent with several key aspects of the 
capabilities-based approach.  First, Singapore’s success has been driven by attracting, keeping 
and encouraging the upgrading of foreign investment. Government linked companies were key in 
providing logistical and business services, while foreign companies played the major role in 
establishing manufacturing for export and over  time, upgrading their activities to higher value-
added using increasingly sophisticated technologies.  This was accomplished by deliberate 
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policies aimed at building local labor skills and social capabilities that supported FDI.  
Horizontal policies focused on building infrastructure, including affordable housing, education 
and training, and institutions that were credible and worked toward long-term goals with a focus 
on facilitating business.  Macroeconomic policies, such as low inflation, an exchange rate 
managed to prevent overvaluation and fiscal conservatism, also contributed greatly to create an 
excellent environment for business.  Industrial policies that targeted specific sectors were 
primarily focused on improving technology.   A key aspect of the development process 
beginning in the 1960s was to create competitiveness through skill development in tandem with 
plans to eventually move away from labor-intensive manufacturing (Beng 1997: 96).  These 
vertical policies granted tax and other incentives in exchange for upgrading, training and job 
creation for both foreign and Singaporean national firms.   
 Underlying Singapore’s development strategy has been a unique political-economic 
environment.  On the one hand, a single party political continuity helped focus the development 
goals and coordinate the public-private sectors, as well as the interests within the public sector.   
On the other hand, there also existed an open, competitive business environment in which local, 
private firms were not protected and hence have not developed as much as they would in other 
contexts.  However, TNCs that were attracted to Singapore were not exploiting resources or 
competing directly with local firms, which made the acceptance of TNCs easier, both politically 
and economically (Chia 2005).  Based on measured outcomes, Singapore has flourished as a 
result.  Hence it is difficult to argue that Singapore has been over-reliant on FDI.    
 
The Next Stage? 
Whether Singapore can continue to rely on FDI as it moves to the next stage of a knowledge 
economy is a fair question.  Recent studies have found positive effects of FDI on innovation.  
For example, Kemeny (2010) shows with a cross-country analysis that FDI’s effect on 
technological upgrading is evident in poor countries, but stronger if they have some minimum 
level of social capability.  Kemeny’s results further show that richer countries also benefit from 
FDI, just not as much.  Lin and Lin (2010) show that outward flows of FDI have a larger positive 
effect on product innovation than inward flows, imports or exports, but they all have some 
positive effect.  Hence there is evidence that utilizing FDI to upgrade technology and spur 
innovation can work.   
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 While FDI can facilitate the move to a knowledge-based economy, some analysts argue 
that sustained development into the next stage is unlikely to occur without innovative local firms 
(Schrank 2008).  Lall (2005), for example, argues that while access to technology is in principle 
the same across countries, where it goes and succeeds depends on the learning capability of a 
place, and this is influenced greatly by the abilities of local firms.   Another concern is that 
higher profits resulting from higher value-added activities will be earned by foreign firms and 
repatriated, rather than earned by local firms unless the local firms are engaged in these 
activities.  Policy makers in Singapore seem well aware of these issues.  There are numerous 
signs that Singapore has gone beyond simply establishing supply links between local firms and 
TNCs, and in recent years policy has increasingly emphasized developing local firm capabilities.   
Also, the cluster approach in Singapore incorporates many stages within a sector so that 
innovations can occur anywhere along the chain.  In the biomedical area, for example, many 
innovation possibilities exist beyond just drug discoveries.  This may help lessen the difficulties 
of head-to-head competition with foreign firms and increase the opportunities of local firms to 
innovate to complement the strengths of foreign firms. 
 Perhaps the success of the next stage of development in knowledge-based innovation will 
rest less on the nature of FDI’s role and more on the right type of social interaction to allow the 
creativity and networking necessary for success (Parayil 2005: 68; OECD 2000: 59).  This may 
require yet another iteration of upgrading institutions to create conditions for a new stage of 
development.  Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) identify four country host factors that influence the 
decisions of foreign subsidiaries to locate there:  support provided by the host government, the 
strategic importance of the host country, the relative cost of factor inputs and the dynamism of 
the local economy.  The first two factors are well established for Singapore.  The third, relative 
costs, has been more challenging because of shortages of labor and land in particular, but other 
costs of doing business are likely to be low in Singapore as suggested by its high rank in the Ease 
of Doing Business Surveys.  The fourth factor—dynamism of the local economy—exists but is 
driven largely by foreign firms.  The costs of this characteristic of Singapore’s economy may 
increasingly be showing up in declines in productivity and the importance of manufacturing and 
high-tech exports.  A direct link between these phenomena has yet to be established, but policy 
makers in Singapore seem to be worrying about just such a possibility as global competition 
heats up for export markets around the world.   
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Table 1  Summary of Selected Growth Performance Indicators, Singapore, 1965-2010 
 
Year GDP  
per capita 
(2000 
constant $) 
GDP 
growth 
(five year 
averages) 
Life 
expectancy 
(years at 
birth) 
Population 
growth  
rate 
Manufacturing 
(share of 
GDP) 
Services 
(share of 
GDP) 
Agriculture 
(share of  
GDP) 
1965 2,733 -- 66 2.4 -- -- -- 
1970 4,531 12.6 68 1.6 -- -- -- 
1975 6,417 9.9 70 1.5 23.2 64.0 2.3 
1980 9,043 7.6 71 1.3 30.0 60.3 1.6 
1985 10,866 7.0 73 0.1 22.6 62.9 1.0 
1990 14,658 6.7 74 3.9 27.3 64.9 0.4 
1995 19,359 8.9 76 3.0 26.5 64.7 0.2 
2000 23,019 6.7 78 1.7 27.7 64.3 0.1 
2005 26,886 5.4 80 2.4 26.9 68.9 0.1 
2010 32,538 2.9 81 1.8 22.2 71.7 0.04 
Source: World Bank Database, http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
  
Table 2   Singapore’s Changing Export Composition, 1970-2010 
 
Year Manufacturing 
Exports (% of 
merchandise 
exports) 
High-Tech 
Exports  (% of 
manufactured 
exports) 
ICT Goods 
Exports 
(% of total 
exports) 
ICT Services 
Exports  (% of 
services 
exports) 
1970 27.7 -- -- -- 
1975 41.5 -- -- -- 
1980 46.7 -- -- -- 
1985 51.2 -- -- -- 
1990 71.6 -- -- -- 
1995 83.9 53.9 -- -- 
1997 -- -- 54.1 -- 
2000 85.6 62.6 56.1 2.4 
2005 81.1 56.6 46.4 2.0 
2010 73.1 49.9 35.4* 2.8 
Note: * ICT Goods exports are for 2009. Source: World Bank Database, http://databank.worldbank.org. 
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Table 3  Singapore’s Technology-Intensive Trade, Selected Years 1989-2008 
 
Percentage of Exports by Level of Technology 1989-1990 1999-2000 2007-2008 
Primary 7% 2% 2% 
Resource-Based 25% 13% 24% 
Low-Tech 9% 7% 6% 
Medium-Tech 23% 18% 20% 
High-Tech 36% 60% 48% 
Percentage of Imports by Level of Technology 1989-1990 1999-2000 2007-2008 
Primary 17% 9% 14% 
Resource-Based 13% 11% 19% 
Low-Tech 12% 9% 7% 
Medium-Tech 30% 23% 21% 
High-Tech 27% 49% 38% 
Source: Calculated with data from UN-COMTRADE.  
 
 
 
Table 4   Summary of Selected Infrastructure Indicators: Singapore, Selected Years 
 
Year Container 
Port 
Traffic 
(TEU: 20 
foot 
equivalent 
units, 
1000s) 
Air 
Transport, 
passengers 
carried, 
(1000s) 
Air 
Transport, 
Freight 
(million 
ton-km) 
Telephone 
Lines (per 
100 
people) 
Mobile 
Cellular 
Subscriptions 
(per 100 
people) 
Internet 
Users 
(per 100 
people) 
1970 -- 749 9 5 -- -- 
1975 -- 1815 147 9 -- -- 
1980 -- 3827 544 22 -- -- 
1985 -- 4912 981 29 -- -- 
1990 -- 7046 1653 35 2 -- 
1995 -- 10779 3687 41 9 3 
2000 17100 16704 6005 48 68 32 
2005 23192 17744 7571 43 103 62 
2009 25866 18427 7391 -- -- -- 
2010 -- -- -- 39 144 70 
 Source: World Bank Database. 
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Table 5  Firm Capabilities in Singapore: Various Indicators, 1970-2009 
 
Year 
R&D 
(% of 
GDP) 
Researchers 
in R&D per 
1 million 
people 
Scientific 
and 
Technical 
Journal 
Articles 
Trademark 
Applications 
(Direct Non-
resident) 
Trademark 
Applications 
(Direct 
Resident) 
Patent 
Applications 
(Non-
Resident) 
Patent 
Applications 
(Resident) 
1970 -- -- -- 1750 1014 289 1 
1975 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1980 -- -- -- 3501 2072 631 2 
1981 -- -- 124 -- -- -- -- 
1985 -- -- 289 -- -- 1003 4 
1990 -- -- 572 -- -- -- -- 
1995 -- -- 1141 -- -- 2412 145 
1996 1.4 2535 1141 -- -- -- 224 
2000 1.9 4139 2361 17062 5187 7720 516 
2005 2.3 5575 3611 9885 5067 8170 569 
2007 2.6 6088 3792 11170 5383 9255 696 
2009 -- -- -- 5234 4104 7986 750 
Source: World Bank Databank 
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Figure 1  Multifactor Productivity: Contributions to Growth in Real GDP, 1999-2009 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics. 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Entry and Exit of Firms in Singapore, 2000, 2005-2010 
Note: Data on companies and businesses are primarily sourced from the registration records of the 
Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority; Source: Singapore Department of Statistics;  
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/com  
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Figure 3  R&D Expenditure by Public & Private Sectors, 1999, 2004-2009 
Note: Data on Research & Development (R&D) in Singapore are collected through the National Survey of 
R&D, conducted annually by the Agency for Science, Technology and Research; Source: Singapore 
Department of Statistics; http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/economy/rnd.html 
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